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Introduction
The so-called "double agreement phenomenon" is a topic of current 
interest in the social psychological literature. "Double agreement" 
refers to a subject’s endorsement of an item as well as its subsequent 
reversal.
Peabody (1961) infers from the occurrence of double agreement to 
items (and their reversals) on the California F test (authoritarianism), 
Anti-Semitism scale (Adorno, 1950), and Dogmatism (Rokeach, 1956) scale 
a so-called "agreement response set." (ARS) That is, the content of 
the items is presumed to be irrelevant. This view, of course, would 
logically lead to a tentative rejection of the so-called authoritarian­
ism syndrome, as defined by F, Dogmatism (D) or Anti-Semitism (A-S) 
content. Sources relevant to these scales include Christie and Cook 
(1958), and Christie, Havel and Seidenberg (1958).
Peabody further suggested that agreement response set as a deter­
minant of item endorsement does not operate in a blanket fashion. Sub­
jects do not endorse items indiscriminately; only those items whose 
content are "ambiguous" are subject to double agreement. Peabody did 
not further specify the concept "ambiguous," nor was empirical support 
for this ad hoc hypothesis presented.
Rokeach (1963) discussed Peabody's "ambiguity" hypothesis in detail 
and concluded that no experimental demonstration of its validity has 
thus far been presented. Unfortunately, he also neglected to present 
data relevant to this hypothesis.
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Peabody (1966) in a recent paper reaffirmed his original contention 
that item ambiguity predicts double agreement. Oddly, he neither re­
viewed or presented data to substantiate his position. Such data is 
apparently not at hand.
The main objective of this study is an identification of conditions 
under which double agreement occurs. It is proposed that double agree­
ment bears a positive relationship to item ambiguity. A criterion of 
ambiguity will be presented. This represents a test of Peabody's hypoth­
esis, for which no empirical evidence appears to be available.
Secondly, it is proposed that individual differences in predisposi­
tion to acquiesce can be identified. Subjects characterized by suscepti­
bility to social influence will show more acquiescence. Specifically, 
it is proposed that high need for approval subjects will show more 
double agreement than do low need for approval subjects. The approval 
motive construct's utility for predicting many behavioral phenomena is 
established (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964). It is implicitly assumed that 
approval-dependent subjects feel they are behaving in a socially desired 
manner by complying with demand implications of the experiment, that is, 
by agreeing to most items presented them by Eh
Recapitulating, the following experimental hypotheses will be 
tested:
Hypothesis 1: High need for approval subjects show more double
agreement than do low need for approval subjects.
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Hypothesis 2; The greater the ambiguity of combined original and 
reversed item, the higher the incidence of double agreement.
Procedure
Materials
Materials utilized in this investigation included items drawn from 
original F, Dogmatism, and Anti-Semitism scales as used by Peabody (1961), 
Peabody's reversals of these items, ambiguity rating sheets with appro­
priate instructions, and copies of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability 
Scale (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964, pp. 23-24). Original and reversed 
scales appeared separately in test booklets in one of three counter­
balanced orders. Items were numbered consecutively so that subjects 
were confronted with a single, eighty-eight item questionnaire. In 
addition, Peabody’s reversals were placed in individual scales in an 
order reversing their sequential appearance in original scales. This 
procedure was employed to lessen the probability that a subject would 
remember the exact content of original items. For the rating session, 
statements were separated into original and reversed booklets, but were 
neither counterbalanced nor disguised so as to appear as a single set of 
statement.
Subj ects
One hundred eighty freshmen students participated as subjects 
in the actual testing phases and were randomly assigned to separate 
subgroups. This group was composed of one hundred eight males and 
seventy-two females, with a mean age of 19.6.
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Ambiguity Ratings
The operational definition of "ambiguity" involves a dimension which 
may be called, "the clarity of the statement." Subjects participating 
in this part of the study constituted a sample of judges who rated the 
ambiguity of items on the basis of this definition. Original and re­
versed items were placed into separate booklets and randomly distributed 
to these subjects who were then given the following instructions:
You are to assess the ambiguity of the following statements in terms 
of the degree to which you understand their content and meaning.
We are not concerned with whether you do or do not agree with the 
item; nor are we concerned with whether you would admit that it is 
true of you. We are solely concerned with whether or not you are 
clear as to what is being asked. Please rate each item's ambiguity 
by placing a mark at the appropriate point on the scale for each 
item. Two poles are presented on each scale: "Clear, straightfpr-
ward," and "ambiguous." You are to judge where on this continum 
each item falls. Be sure and mark each statement; do not leave any 
out.
Eight-point scales were utilized for the ambiguity ratings. Ambiguity 
values for each original and reversed item were determined by finding 
their mean value as rated by the subjects. The ambiguity of item-pairs 
was calculated from these data. Two independent groups rated the items. 
Group A rated originals, group B reversals.
Testing Phase
Subjects who participated in testing phases were given the follow­
ing directions, adapted from Peabody (1961):
PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY: This is a study of what the general public
thinks about a number of social questions. The best answer to each 
statement below is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover many 
different points of view. You may find yourself agreeing with some of 
the statements strongly, disagreeing just as strongly with others, and 
perhaps feeling less strongly about others. Whether you agree or 
disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many people feel the 
same way you do.
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Do not place answers or other marks on the questionnaire. If you agree 
with the statement, place a line in alternative one on the IBM sheet.
If you disagree with the statement, darken alternative two. Please be 
sure you have answered all of the questions and have your answers in the 
right places on the IBM sheet.
Subjects who volunteered for the afternoon session were assigned 
to group A; those who signed up for the evening session were assigned to 
group B. Group A subjects first answered the Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale, then the original authoritarianism scales. At the 
end of this session, they were instructed to return at the same hour for 
another experiment but were told nothing else. Two days later the same 
subjects answered the reversed scales. Group B answered the Marlowe- 
Crowne test and then participated in the opposite order, that is, these 
subjects answered reversals at the first sessions, original scales two 
days later.
Results
Data used to test Hypothesis 1 appear in Table 1.
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TABLE 1
Correlations between Marlowe-Crowne Scores and Double Agreement 
Scores on F, D, and A-S Scales, and Summated over Scales.
Scale
Pearson
r P*
Mean 
DA Score
Range of 
DA Scores
F .36 .001 6.79 1-17
D .44 .001 10.00 3-36
A-S .25 .001 2.44 0-15
Over
scales .44 .001 19.23 4-48
P* values are one-tailed
Mean values listed refer to the average of subjects' double agree­
ment scores (DA) obtained on the F, Dogmatism, and Anti-Semitism scales, 
as well as to total double agreement scores summated over all three 
scales. These values are 6.79, 10.00, 2.44, and 19.23 respectively. 
Ranges for these measures are also provided.
For providing a specific test of the validity of the hypothesis 
that need for approval bears a positive linear relationship to double 
agreement, Pearson rs were computed not only between subjects' Marlowe- 
Crowne and double agreement scores on the F, Dogmatism, and Anti- 
Semitism scales separately, but also for double agreement scores sum- 
mated over all scales. As shown in Table 1, the values of jr associated 
with these measures are .36 for the F scale, .44 for the Dogmatism 
scale, .25 for the Anti-Semitism scale, and .44 over scales. With df 
equal to 178 in all cases, all correlations are significant beyond the
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.001 level. These results clearly indicate a strong relationship between 
need for approval and acquiescence. Hypothesis 1, under conditions de­
scribed in the present sample, must be considered tenable.
Ambiguity ratings for individual original and reversed scales in 
all three tests appear in appendices 1, 2 , and 3. Values for individual 
original and reversed items were subsequently averaged to yield the 
ambiguity scale values for each of the itfem-pairs. Additionally, these 
appendices include double agreement responses given to each item, 
expressed both as frequencies and percentages. Item-pair ambiguity 
values were then correlated with the frequency of double agreement 
associated with the particular stimuli.
Pearson rs serve to test the validity of the hypothesis that item 
ambiguity bears a positive linear relationship to double agreement. 
Coefficients are as appear in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Correlations between Rated Ambiguity and Frequency of Double 
Agreement on F, D, and A-S Scales.
Scale Pearson r P*
F 0000 .001
D .83 .001
A-S .65 .001
P* values are one-tailed 
The values of r_ are, respectively, .88 for the F scale, .83 for
the Dogmatism scale, and .65 for the Anti-Semitism scale. With df equal
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to 26, 38, and 18, all correlations are significant beyond the .001 level. 
These results indicate an extremely strong positive relationship between 
rated ambiguity of item-pairs and frequency of double agreement on all 
three measures of authoritarianism. Hypothesis 2, under the conditions 
described, must likewise be considered tenable.
Discussion
The major reason conducting the present investigation was to pro­
vide a direct empirical test of Peabody's ad hoc hypothesis that double 
agreement to original and reversed authoritarianism scales is a positive 
function of the scales' ambiguity. The present data clearly indicate 
that, within separate tests, the more ambiguous an F, Dogmatism, or 
Anti-Semitism scale item, the more likely will be double agreement (DA) 
to that item and its reversal.
To date, two major criticisms have been formulated against Peabody's 
assertion that the phenomenon of agreement response set (ARS) casts 
doubt on the ability of authoritarianism scales to measure the so-called 
"authoritarian personality."
Samuelson (1964) suggested that the occurrence of double agreement 
in Peabody's data (1961) may be a function of asymmetrical reversals of 
original items. Should this be the case, endorsement of both original 
and reversal could arise because both statements fall within a given 
subject's agreement continuum, and as such, double agreement constitutes 
consistent responding on his part. Double agreement in this case would 
not militate against a content analysis of endorsement of original 
■authoritarian items. Although this interpretation appears a priori
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reasonable, contrary evidence has been presented (Peabody, 1966; Miklich, 
1966). Miklich's data are particularly damaging, in that a Kuder- 
Richardson formula (form 20) applied to original and reversed items 
(treated as item-pairs) produced a value of .54. Peabody's reversals 
are in fact relatively homogeneous.
Rokeach (1963) contended that no evidence exists to support Pea­
body's agreement response set hypothesis, either to the effect that 
authoritarianism scale items are ambiguous, or, even granting ambiguity, 
that it predicts to double agreement. He presents an alternative hypoth­
esis to the effect that a given subject endorses both an original and
reversed item because he is responding truthfully to the former and 
deliberately lying to the latter for reasons of his own. One such 
reason is that an authoritarian subject will view original authoritar­
ianism items as harmless. Their reversals will be falsely agreed to
because such agreement is socially desirable.
Rokeach's hypothesis has to date received no empirical verification 
and is exclusively supported by anecdotal accounts. Additionally, it 
appears untenable on two grounds. First, Stanley and Martin (1964) 
found a significant negative relationship between original Dogmatism 
scale items and the Martin Social Desirability Scale, that is, agreement 
to Dogmatism items is not socially desirable behavior. Further, scores 
on a reversed Dogmatism scale failed to correlate significantly with the 
Martin test for a group of high acquiescent subjects. On the other hand, 
the present data clearly demonstrate that frequency of double agreement 
is a positive function of the relative ambiguity of item-pairs.
Rokeach's formulation to date appears to be without support.
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Peabody’s basic rationale contends that a significant proportion of 
high "authoritarian" scores on F, Dogmatism, and Anti-Semitism scales 
represent an artifact produced by an interaction between subject and 
content variables. Following Cronbach's (1946) well-known analysis of 
agreement set tendencies, he suggests that agreement response set to 
original statements constitutes a subject characteristic stemming from 
response uncertainty created when subjects are forced to deal with 
ambiguous items.
How ambiguous are authoritarianism items? The evidence in the 
literature seems to reflect little other than rank opinion. The mean 
ambiguity scale values for the F, Dogmatism, and Anti-Semitism items 
in the present sample are 3.84, 3.77, and 4.31. None of these values 
indicate ambiguity in an absolute sense as they all fall at or below 
the mid-point of an eight-point scale. Relatedly, Rokeach (1963) is 
"puzzled" by the high incidence of double agreement on the Anti-Semitism 
scale in Peabody’s 1961 data. In his opinion, the Anti-Semitism scale 
is "known" to be less ambiguous than either F or Dogmatism scales. This 
study, however, indicates that the Anti-Semitism scale is the most 
ambiguous of the three used, significantly more so than the F (p ^ .02) 
or Dogmatism (p <  .01) scales. Again, Rokeach appears in error.
Another relevant consideration concerns the frequency of double 
agreement. For the F, Dogmatism, and Anti-Semitism scales respectively, 
double agreement represents 24%, 25%, and 12% of subjects' total re­
sponses. Although the incidence of such behavior is substantial, it 
nevertheless is approximately one-third less than that reported by 
Peabody (1961). Of greater significance, however, is the fact that the
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smallest frequency of double agreement occurred on the scale (Anti- 
Semitism) rated as most ambiguous. This finding is noteworthy in that 
Peabody reasoned that the more ambiguous a scale, the greater the fre­
quency of double agreement to be expected. The present data warrant the 
conclusion that Peabody's hypothesis that double agreement is a function 
of the ambiguity of the test's items bears modification. The relative 
ambiguity of items in a given scale and not a test's overall ambiguity 
seems to relate to double agreement on that test.
An additional finding concerns the substantial relationship demon­
strated between double agreement scores and subjects' need for approval 
scores. Confirmation of Hypothesis 1 warrants the conclusion that many 
high authoritarian scores may be an artifact created by an interaction 
between high approval need and perceived social pressures inherent in 
any group testing situation. This finding serves to specify one signi­
ficant population variable involved in the erroneous identification of 
bogus "authoritarians." Given the nature of approval dependent indi­
viduals (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964), the finding increases the credibility 
of an explanation of "bogus" authoritarians in terms of situational 
factors, specifically, social pressure.
In summary, the results of this investigation indicate that Peabody's 
agreement response set construct is essentially correct but nevertheless 
requires modification. While some individual scale items are in fact 
highly ambiguous, the assertion that the scales themselves are ambiguous 
in an absolute sense remains unsupported. Unfortunately, little evidence 
is available as to the absolute level of ambiguity on other like instru­
ments, e.g., the MMPI. Perhaps authoritarianism tests are more ambiguous
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than similar diagnostic tools. The issue invites investigation rather 
than additional pontification. Finally, the present data indicate that 
need for approval is a subject characteristic worthy of consideration in 
analyzing the double agreement problem. Data provide concrete support 
for Peabody's (1961, 1966) contention that agreement set response does 
not operate in blanket fashion.
High authoritarian scores may in many cases represent little more 
than the result of ambiguous measuring scales and perceived social pres­
sures inherent in the testing situation itself. There appears little 
need to invoke a content syndrome. Accurate identification of "author­
itarians" by means of the content of traditional scales must be viewed 
with profound skepticism. We feel that Samuelson, Rokeach, and others 
who would preserve the credibility of these scales must demonstrate 
their construct validity. Only a methodology that goes beyond tradi­
tional construct validation appears capable of satisfying necessary 
criteria. Constructive steps toward developing such procedures appear 
in Loevinger (1957) and Campbell and Fiske (1959). The essential 
requirement of both models is that construct validity, even if estab­
lished by conventional procedures, must in addition include a demonstra­
tion that the measure under consideration correlate neither with known 
or suspected error sources, nor with secular trends, such as agreement 
response set, social desirability, or examination variables.
These additional criteria for establishing construct validation 
seem essential in consideration of the authoritarian syndrome precisely 
because authoritarianism measures do meet traditional and less rigorous 
requirements of correlation with postulated aspects of the syndrome.
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Regardless, as we have clearly seen, the construct validity of these 
measures is seriously in question. By endorsing more rigorous require­
ments for validation of measures of authoritarianism, we may yet identify 
some "content" which accurately characterizes authoritarians,, This seems 
a worthwhile goal and one of greater ultimate significance than the 
tedious, if essential, demonstrations that the present postulated content 
of authoritarian scales finds scant support in the data and is attri­
butable principally to both sources of error variance and secular trends.
McBride
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Appendix 1
Mean Ambiguity Values and Double Agreement Responses: F Scale
Item Original Reversed Item Pair Freq. DA Per cent DA
1. 2.20 2.40 2.30 12 6.66%
2. 4.14 4.89 4.64 78 43.33%
3. 3.86 2.64 3.25 33 18.33%
4. 4.10 4.83 4.46 64 35.55%
5. 4.40 4.51 4.45 50 27.77%
6. 3.96 3.08 3.52 40 22.22%
7. 3.48 2.18 2.83 13 7.22%
8. 3.33 2.89 3.11 17 9.44%
9. 3.69 3.82 3.75 32 17.77%
10. 5.09 2.78 3.93 43 23.88%
11. 2.95 2.69 2.82 13 7.22%
12. 3.39 3.39 3.39 28 15.55%
13. 2.77 4.34 3.55 29 16.11%
14. 3.78 5.14 4.46 41 22.77%
15. 4.35 3.13 3.74 31 17.22%
16. 3.41 3.12 3.26 15 8.33%
17. 3.55 4.69 4.12 39 21.66%
18. 3.57 3.87 3.72 37 20.55%
19. 3.35 3.54 3.44 20 11.11%
20. 3.57 4.98 4.27 37 20.55%
21. 4.84 5.59 5.21 92 51.11%
22. 3.29 3.48 3.38 33 18.33%
23. 3.48 3.57 3.52 33 18.33%
24. 5.50 3.89 4.69 87 48.33%
25. 3.70 4.43 4.07 33 18.33%
26. 4.47 4.08 4.27 49 27.22%
27. 4.39 4.11 4.25 58 32.22%
28. 4.40 3.86 4.15 37 20.55%
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Appendix 2
Mean Ambiguity Values and Double Agreement Responses: D Scale.
Item Original Revers ed Item Pair Freq. DA Per cent DA
1. 4.31 3.77 4.04 46 25.55%
2. 4.61 4.21 4.41 66 33.33%
3. 4.41 4.54 4.47 69 38.33%
4. 4.40 1.81 3.10 32 17.77%
5. 4.52 4.31 4.41 47 26011%
6. 2.61 4.93 3.77 33 18.33%
7. 2.71 3.49 3.10 37 20.55%
8. 3.76 5.78 4.77 119 66.22%
9. 4.34 4.33 4.33 60 33.33%
10. 3.35 3.77 3.65 52 28.33%
11. 4.67 4.50 4.58 78 43.33%
12. 4.07 3.07 3.57 33 18.33%
13. 3.98 2.11 3.04 20 11.11%
14. 4.31 3.13 3.72 46 25.55%
15. 3.53 3.42 3.47 63 35.00%
16. 3.49 2.36 2.92 20 11.11%
17. 4.06 3.83 3.94 32 17.77%
18. 3,39 5.34 4, 36 57 31.66%
19. 4.44 3.98 4.21 53 29.44%
20. 4.82 3.07 3.95 38 21.11%
21. 4.17 4.17 4.17 48 26.66%
22. 3.76 5.43 4.59 97 53.88%
23. 3.83 2.55 3.19 19 10.55%
24. 3.60 3.35 3.47 24 13.33%
25. 2.72 4.33 3.52 24 13.33%
26. 3.95 4.17 4.06 77 42.77%
27. 3.86 4.24 4.05 24 13.33%
28. 4.07 4.47 4.27 51 28.33%
29. 4.40 3.66 4.03 38 21.11%
30. 3.74 3.01 3.37 23 12.88%
31. 3.04 2.05 2.54 7 3.88%
32. 3.56 3.56 3.56 36 20.00%
33. 3.25 4.37 3.37 38 21.11%
34. 3.06 3.69 3.37 35 19.44%
35. 2.58 2.52 2.55 6 3.33%
36. 2.47 2.87 2.67 17 9.44%
37. 3.52 3.34 3.43 35 19.44%
38. 3.20 4.52 3.86 41 22.88%
39. 3.93 5.41 4.67 76 42.22%
40. 3.54 5.51 4.52 81 45.00%
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Mean Ambiguity Values and Double Agreement Responses: A-S Scale.
Item Original Reversed Item Pair Freq. DA Per cent DA
1. 4.79 4.39 4.57 55 30.55%
2. 3.13 2.82 2.97 4 2.22%
3. 5.30 3.10 4.20 16 8.88%
4. 5.42 2.70 4.06 11 6.11%
5. 4.60 3.13 3.86 8 4.44%
6. 5.19 2.74 3.96 9 5.00%
7. 4.37 3.07 3.72 13 7.22%
8. 4.24 3.64 3.94 26 14.44%
9. 4.60 2.14 3.37 8 4.44%
10. 3.83 4.02 3.92 27 15.00%
11. 3.88 2.54 3.19 8 10.55%
12. 4.95 3.58 4.26 12 6.66%
13. 4.10 3.16 3.63 13 7.22%
14. 4.35 4.44 4.39 47 26.16%
15. 3.22 3.10 3.16 13 7.22%
16. 3.85 4.60 4.22 38 21.11%
17. 3.93 1.83 2.88 9 5.00%
18. 4.01 3.74 3.87 21 11.66%
19. 4.41 3.53 3.96 21 11.66%
20. 4.10 3.65 3.87 23 12.88%
